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What is done in England by combination, unless it be the management of municipal concerns, is
most generally done by a combination of individuals, established by mere articles of agreement.
On the other hand, what is done here by the co-operation of several persons, is, in the greater
number of instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or charter of
incorporation. … We cannot but be impressed with a deep sense of the importance of this law in
our own country … In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an extent, as in
our own. If a native of Europe, who has never traversed the wide barrier which separates him
from us should be informed, even with tolerable accuracy, of the number of Banking Companies,
Insurance Companies, Canal Companies, Turnpike Companies, Manufacturing Companies &c.
… that are diffused throughout these United States, and fully invested with corporate privileges,
he could not be made to believe that he was told the truth. – (Angell and Ames 1832, v-vi, 35).
By breaking away from Great Britain and forming a new system of government, the
Founding generation transformed the institutional basis of their young nation’s economy. No
longer rigidly tied to Britain’s empire or laws, Americans were free to build upon their colonial
and British heritages and to adapt the best features of the Old World to the unique circumstances
of the new. They strove to imitate what worked well, improve what did not, develop what
remained inchoate, and jettison what failed miserably. The multi-faceted economic
transformation they engineered spawned the world’s largest, richest, and most dynamic
economy.
The development of the for-profit business corporation
2 was one of the most original and
important aspects of the new nation’s institutional transformation (Dodd 1954, 1, 195; Angell
2 Municipal governments, churches, and sundry non-profit associations often took the corporate form and have been
studied in some detail elsewhere. Here the concern is with “corporations formed with the primary object of securing2
and Ames 1832, v, vii; Seavoy 1982, 46-47; Hurst 1970, 8; Arner 2002, 24). Before the
Revolution, American business corporations were few, small, and largely inconsequential.
3 The
weight of imperial regulations and unenlightened and uninspired British corporate law, which
imposed relatively high costs on would be incorporators while offering little in the way of
benefits (Banner 1998, 1-121; Dodd 1954, 195-97; Anon. 1835, 10), induced most colonial
entrepreneurs to choose other business forms, including sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
the unincorporated joint stock firm (Livermore 1939). Table 1 shows that after the Revolution,
and particularly after ratification of the Constitution (Baldwin 1903, 449-65; Davis 1917, 4-8,
22-25, 31-32), U.S. corporations rapidly grew in number. By 1801, the institutional groundwork
for further growth and development – some 20,000 specially chartered corporations with about
$6 to $7 billion of authorized capital would be created by 1860 – had been laid. As the head
quote suggests, within a generation America became the world’s leader in corporate
development, including the number of corporations and the sophistication and flexibility of its
innovative corporate law (Maier 1993, 52; Dodd 1954, 198; Anon. 1829, 94; Cochran 1974).
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Although debates about existing corporations or the efficacy of the corporate form played
little role in its adoption, the Constitution was a formative element in the rise of the corporation
nation. Many Americans, especially those in the more market-oriented coastal areas, readily
perceived that the new frame of government struck the right balance between the lethargy of the
Articles of Confederation and the tyranny of British monarchy and that it contained sufficient
pecuniary gain or avoiding pecuniary loss, for the benefit of the members” (Davis 1917, 3). A minor class of
business corporations, the corporation sole, or a corporation consisting of a single individual, is also not discussed
here as it was seldom used (Kent 1894, 2:273). For more on other types of corporations, see McCarthy (2003).
Angell and Ames (1832, v), and Seavoy (1982, 9-38).
3 They were not annulled by the Revolution, “for the dismemberment of empire, it is well settled, caused no
destruction of the civil rights of individuals or corporate bodies.” At least one, the Philadelphia Contributionship,
survives to this day (Angell and Ames 1832, 504; Davis 1917, 10; Gower 1956).3
checks and balances to ensure political instability. With policy uncertainty minimized and public
goods like protection of life, liberty, and property relatively well-assured, the latent energies of
entrepreneurs were unleashed (Wright 2008, 75-122). “A laudable spirit of emulation” soon
suffused the nation, including both the “Agricultural and Commercial States of the Union,” the
citizens of which began to undertake “the improvement of their respective territories, and
transportation of their produce to the proper markets, by means of INLAND NAVIGATION and
good ROADS” financed by banks and protected from loss by insurance companies (Anon.
1798a, 1).
The actions of early entrepreneurs bear out their words. In the 1780s, few established
business corporations but the number of non-business corporations such as municipal
governments, churches, and voluntary associations expanded rapidly. Evidently, independence
alone was sufficient to induce Americans to associate but not until the Constitution was in place
were they willing to invest significant sums of their own money in risky, large-scale enterprises.
Cross country comparisons cast additional light on the Constitution’s crucial role in increasing
investment. Entrepreneurs in Florida, Louisiana, California, Texas, and other parts of North
America did not embrace business corporations until they became subject to the Constitution, or
in the case of Canada until they came to be governed by a similarly well-constructed frame of
government (Wright 2008, 237-46).
According to historian Pauline Maier (1993, 51), “social and economic development
could have been accomplished in other ways,” without relying heavily on the corporate form.
That is undoubtedly true but the rate of such development would almost certainly have been
slower. Entrepreneurs establishing for-profit businesses possessed strong incentives to choose
the most efficient form of business organization in order to minimize project costs. Restricting4
access to the corporate form would have prevented the formation of some businesses entirely and
decreased the efficiency of others. Without the corporate form, Americans would have paid more
for their banks, bridges, canals, harbor facilities, roads, waterworks, and other improvements,
waited longer before enjoying them, or extracted less quantity and quality output from them. The
founding choice, to leave corporation formation decisions to state governments and
entrepreneurs, ensured that early Americans could form corporations at relatively low cost in
terms of time and money. Eventually, it ensured that they could do so on demand for a nominal
fee.
This chapter shows that few corporations formed before the Constitution but many after
it. It explains the proliferation of the corporate form from a cost-benefit perspective. Limited
liability, entity shielding, perpetual secession, transferable shares, and the other privileges of the
corporate form allowed corporations to achieve large size relative to other forms of business
organization. Large size allowed corporations to exploit economies of scale, gain market power,
and undertake projects too large, complex, or long-term for other types of organizations to
complete. The biggest cost of the corporate form was agency problems, especially between
stockholders and employees, including managers. Early corporations also faced political risks
associated with the widespread misconception that their “special privileges” threatened the
nation’s political institutions and that corporations constituted pernicious “monopolies,” careful
deconstruction of which term shows that Americans were concerned with issues of market power
and structure. Corporations struggled with those and related problems but reduced them enough
to allow for tremendous growth of both the corporate form and the economy.5
A Cost-Benefit Approach
The 3,884 entrepreneurs
4 involved in forming U.S. corporations in the 1790s opted for
the corporate form when the net benefits (all benefits minus all costs) of incorporating exceeded
the net benefits of forming a sole proprietorship, partnership, or other type of business
organization. For some lines of business, like commercial banking and insurance, the net benefits
of incorporation almost always outweighed the net benefits of other business forms.
5 For other
lines, particularly manufacturing, non-corporate forms sometimes offered higher net benefits. A
few early Pennsylvania iron manufacturers incorporated their firms, for example, but until the
mid-nineteenth century most did not; tanners generally eschewed the corporate form throughout
the nineteenth century (Paskoff 1983, 91-131; Ellsworth 1972, 399-402). In the 1790s, taxation
was low and hence not a major consideration for entrepreneurs deciding whether or not to
incorporate (Heath 1954).
The two main costs of incorporation included internal agency conflicts between majority
and minority shareholders, shareholders and bondholders, and shareholders and managers as well
as the costs of obtaining a charter from state legislatures. The latter cost was increased by
political animosities stemming from commercial rivalry as well as anti-corporate prejudices
inherited from the Old World and the deepest recesses of the human psyche. Until well into the
nineteenth century, incorporation required the formal sanction of government, at times subjecting
early incorporators to intense political pressures. Those costs declined over the first half of the
4 This is the count of all persons named in early acts of incorporation as incorporators or stock subscription agents.
Many individuals were involved in more than one corporation but undoubtedly many others were involved in
corporation formation who were not explicitly mentioned in legislation, which did not always provide the names of
incorporators.
5 This analysis answers the questions raised by Handlin and Handlin (1945). The same net benefit framework can
also be used to analyze why entrepreneurs chose the particular form of incorporation that they did. For-profit
corporations came in three major varieties, joint-stock, mutual, and mixed. Stockholders owned joint-stock
corporations; depositors, policyholders, or other types of customers owned mutuals. Mixed business corporations6
nineteenth century as anti-corporate sentiment waned (without disappearing) and state
legislatures rendered the chartering process faster and cheaper (Anon. 1835, 9-10; Evans 1948).
The biggest benefit of incorporation was the almost singular ability of corporations to
raise large, long-term pools of capital. Demand for long-term corporate securities, both bonds
and equities, stemmed from six major sources: 1) the corporation’s power of perpetual
succession; 2) its ability to sue and be sued in its own name; 3) limited liability and entity
shielding; 4) various technical advantages of corporate over more complex and convoluted
partnership law; 5) the sale of call options in the primary (issuance) market; 6) the existence of
liquid secondary markets. In other legal aspects of business, from general contracts to the
employment of agents, corporations could generally do, within the confines of their charter,
whatever sole proprietors or partnerships could do (Angell and Ames 1832, 376; Anon. 1835,
11-12; Anon. 1829, 94). So when large sums of capital were necessary, and the costs of
obtaining a charter were minimal, entrepreneurs usually opted for incorporation.
Quantifying with precision how much development of the corporate form aided the
growth of the early U.S. economy presents insurmountable empirical barriers. That the corporate
form helped the economy, rather than hurting it or serving a neutral role, is, however,
undeniable. As explained above, entrepreneurs usually sought incorporation because they wanted
to establish and operate large businesses more cheaply than they could by forming
proprietorships or partnerships. Large business enterprises helped economic growth in at least
three ways. First, in many lines of business they lowered production costs by exploiting
economies of scale. Second, large size allowed for greater vertical integration where appropriate.
Third, by holding out the promise of market power they stimulated entrepreneurship and hence
were partly owned by stockholders and partly by customers. In the 1790s, most American corporations took the pure
joint-stock form but several insurers opted for the mutual form.7
helped to drive technological innovation. To the extent that it was too costly or even impossible
to operate large businesses without a corporate charter, incorporation aided the economy
(Cochran 1974).
Counting Costs
Obtaining a corporate charter in early America was far from costless. Those costs varied
over time, place, and type of business but clearly declined over time and just as clearly were
from the start lower than in Europe. Moreover, the costs of obtaining incorporation compared to
the costs of forming other types of businesses are easily overestimated. The costs of governing
corporations, or in other words of limiting the internal agency problems that they faced, were
considerable. Again, though, those costs tended to decrease over time and, compared to the
agency costs of partnerships, are easy to overestimate.
Obtaining a Charter
In the United States in the 1780s and 1790s, as elsewhere in the world in the eighteenth
century, so-called special incorporation was the norm. Obtaining a corporate charter required
passage of a statute, or in other words a law that explicitly granted corporate privileges to a
specific group and that detailed the corporation’s name, location, and vocation, and that
sometimes stipulated its authorized capital, the number and duties of its directors, stockholder
voting rights and liability, and other corporate characteristics. “Corporations,” Zephaniah Swift
correctly asserted in 1795, “can be created only by act of assembly” (Swift 1795, 225).
Many, perhaps most, entrepreneurs were able to win a charter quickly and cheaply by
petitioning the legislature of the state in which they wished to conduct business (Hurst 1970, 46-
47; Blandi 1934, 92). Paper, pen, publicity, and postage, as well as the time needed to collect8
signatures and shepherd a bill through the legislature, constituted the biggest outlays. Other
enterprisers expended large amounts of time, effort, and money, including the cost of lobbyists
and bribes, before gaining charter (Cadman 1949, 7-12). Costs increased, but usually were not
doubled, when a corporation, like a toll bridge over the Delaware River (separating New Jersey
from Pennsylvania), needed to obtain a charter from two states. Additional costs were incurred if
a corporation needed to update its charter, a frequent occurrence (Cadman 1949, 13-14). Those
costs varied with the ambitiousness of the suggested amendment(s) but apparently were seldom
prohibitive as in many states the number of charter revisions equaled or exceeded the number of
new charters granted.
Every experience was unique but some generalizations can be made. Generally,
entrepreneurs who sought to compete with the state, either directly or because the state owned
shares in existing enterprises, found it costlier to obtain a charter than ones who did not threaten
the state’s coffers. Likewise, enterprises that seemed to offer more direct net public benefits
found incorporation relatively cheaper (Livermore 1935, 674-87; Dodd 1954, 44; Gunn 1988,
106; Seavoy 1982, 5-7; Hurst 1970, 15; Heath 1954, 323-24). Toll bridge companies, for
example, found it cheaper to gain legislative sanction than, say, mining companies. Turnpikes
created public benefits but sometimes encountered political resistance because they could invoke
the dreaded power of eminent domain (Majewski 2000, 85-86). Smaller enterprises, all else
constant, had an easier go of it than larger ones. Most importantly, the costs of obtaining a
charter trended downward over time in most states as anti-corporate angst subsided and more
legislators sought to aid business interests (Moss 2002, 53-84). Legislators also became more
efficient by copying existing charters, creating charter blanks and blanket corporation laws, and,9
eventually, passing general incorporation acts that de-politicized the chartering process (Dodd
1954, 3, 269-70; Gunn 1988, 110, 227; Seavoy 1982, 5; Cadman 1949, 12).
Those gains were partially offset, however, by increased imposition of bonuses or other
taxes on new and existing corporations (Livermore 1935, 676-77; Dodd 1954, 30-31, 45-46, 266-
68; Angell and Ames 1832, 257-74; Blandi 1934, 72-81; Cadman 1949, 389-404). Large
increases in the number of corporate charters granted in the first half of the nineteenth century
were a function of both an increased number of entrepreneurs seeking incorporation and the
decreased cost of producing charters. (In economic parlance, more charters were obtained due to
a rightward shift of the incorporation demand curve and a rightward shift of the incorporation
supply curve.)
Regardless of time or place, legislators faced limits on the costs that they could impose
on entrepreneurs, who enjoyed at least three other major options. One was to bide time and try
again at the next session. The Bank of New York took that approach. Another was to set up
operations in a more pliable state. The Society for the Establishment of Useful Manufactures, for
example, opted for New Jersey after its legislature expressed support for the project (Cadman
1949, 32-33).
6 Likewise, the Jersey Bank nominally operated in Jersey City but kept an office on
Wall Street where it conducted most of its business. Later, it incorporated in New York to avoid
a New Jersey tax on bank capital (Anon. 1804b; Dreikorn 1949, 22).
A third option was to organize as an unincorporated joint-stock association, a sort of
charter by private contract rather than government sanction. Precedent for this included British
common law joint-stock associations in general and various colonial joint-stock associations,
including colonial land companies and the Philadelphia Linen Manufactory, in particular (Dodd
6 By the 1830s, such practices were rampant: “When they could not get charters from our own legislature, they
procured them from other states” (Taylor 1833, 16).10
1954, 366-67; Davis 1917, 5, 258-62; Livermore 1939). Established during the long debt
deflation that followed the French and Indian War, the organizers of the linen manufactory
formed a joint-stock company by soliciting subscribers to articles of association or agreement
that tried to replicate the main features of the corporation via contract (Anon. 1764). Initial and
subsequent stockholders signed articles of agreement providing for election of directors and
other internal governance procedures. Creditors, too, had to sign a contract stipulating that the
association’s stockholders were not personally liable for its debts.
Contracting costs and the legal risks of unincorporated status were high enough to induce
most associations to seek a charter until one was obtained (Swift 1795, 225; Moss 2002, 80-83;
Angell and Ames 1832, 23, 46, 373; Hurst 1970, 14; Livermore 1939, 272-94). Nevertheless, a
significant number of entrepreneurs resorted to this expedient. The Bank of New York operated
for some seven years as a joint stock association (Davis 1917, 44-45). Massachusetts’s Essex
Bank was also in operation for about seven years before obtaining a charter (Davis 1917, 78, 98).
The option was removed for banking associations, however, when states passed laws forbidding
unincorporated entities from engaging in commercial banking, or at least the note issue aspect of
it (Dodd 1954, 205-6). That did not stop other types of companies from starting operations as
associations, however. The New York Insurance Company began operations in 1796 under
article of associations before gaining a formal charter in 1798 (New York Insurance Company
1796). The following year, the Marine Insurance Office of Baltimore formed under articles of
association, its 400 shares snapped up by 36 area merchants (Marine Insurance Office 1799). The
Mutual Assurance Company of New York began operations under articles of association in
1787; not until 1798 did it obtain the official sanction of the New York legislature (Mutual
Assurance Company 1787). The Stamford Mutual Insurance Company likewise began its11
existence unincorporated, its members bound by a “constitution” dated February 20, 1797
(Stamford Mutual Insurance Company 1797). The Hamilton Manufacturing Society began
operations a year before receiving its charter in 1797 and the Salem Iron Factory Company
began operations in 1796, four years before obtaining its charter (Seavoy 1982, 61-62; Davis
1917, 279). Numerous other companies held direct public offerings of stock (DPOs) in
anticipation of obtaining a charter, a practice generally upheld by the courts (Dodd 1954, 78-80;
Davis 1917, 33). The Warren Insurance Company and the Washington Insurance Company (both
of Rhode Island), for example, held DPOs, elected directors, and enacted by-laws before the
Rhode Island legislature enacted their charters (Warren Insurance Company 1800; Washington
Insurance Company 1800).
The existence of such associations pressured governments to liberalize chartering
provisions lest they lose control of the process and the power and taxes it brought. Considerable
anti-corporate sentiment among voters, however, constrained legislators from too liberally doling
out charters (Davis 1917, 303-9). Anti-market and anti-monopoly biases may be inbred, a
constant condition of the human psyche, but historical circumstances sometimes exacerbated
those natural predilections (Caplan 2007, 34). The Mother Country’s experience with
monopolies, behemoths aligned with the government ostensibly designed to promote state ends
while simultaneously enriching stockholders, directors, and managers, usually at the expense of
consumers, further biased Americans against early corporations (Hovenkamp 1988, 1,595).
Anti-corporate Angst
In 1796, a British wit defined a corporation as “an infamous relic of the ancient feudal
system; a tyrannical, exclusive monopoly, generally consisting of gluttons, idiots, and
oppressors; brutes in a human form” (Pigott 1796, 15). Harsh words indeed but by no means out12
of line with the sentiments of learned British scholars (Anon. 1785, 11-12; Davis 1917, 6). “One
great cheque to industry in England,” brilliant political economist David Hume was said to have
asserted, “was the erecting of corporations, an abuse which is not yet entirely corrected.”
University of Glasgow professor Adam Smith also disdained most corporations, which he
believed caused two major problems, internal agency conflicts and monopoly (Arner 2002, 38-
42). Agency costs arose from the fact that managers followed their own interests, which were
often distinct from those of stockholders. “Being the managers rather of other people’s money
than of their own,” Smith argued, managers did not watch over the business “with the same
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their
own” (Smith 1937, 700). Outside of banking, insurance, and large public works like canals and
water utilities, joint-stock companies were ill-advised, Smith believed. For most corporations to
be profitable, he argued, the government had to provide them with monopoly privileges (Smith
1937, 699-716), another “great enemy to good management” and economic efficiency (Smith
1776, 1:184).
Monopoly for Smith came in two varieties, international trade restrictions and companies
with considerable domestic market power (Smith 1776, 2:31, 243). Both varieties were lucrative,
Smith pointed out, so “merchants and manufacturers are always demanding a monopoly against
their countrymen” (Smith 1776, 2:50). Business interests often won their monopolies by making
government “subservient” to their interests. “They will,” he explained, “employ the whole
authority of government, and pervert the administration of justice, in order to harrass [sic] and
ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of industry … they may chuse to carry on”
(Smith 1776, 2:252-54). That made it costly, or in extreme cases impossible, for competitors to13
emerge (Smith 1776, 2:42). Able to quash competition with political force instead of innovation,
monopolies grew fat, indolent, and inefficient.
Smith also argued that monopoly trade restrictions “must, in almost all cases, be either a
useless or a hurtful regulation” (Smith 1776, 2:36). “All the original sources of revenue, the
wages of labor, the rent of land, and the profits of stock,” he argued, “the monopoly renders
much less abundant than they otherwise would be” (Smith 1776, 2:219). That was damning
testimony indeed but not everyone agreed with Smith, especially monopolists and their
apologists. Thomas Pownall, for example, told Smith that although he had “seen some errors in
the extension of the measure, further than is expedient or necessary, yet I do not see the
malignancy of the principle of monopoly; nor while I have lived amidst the daily proofs of the
relative advantage which it gives to the mother country, by its colonies” over other foreign
powers (Pownall 1776, 7). In America, however, the nuance of the parent was lost; monopoly
was evil, plain and simple.
The wrenching separation from the mother country helps to explain the especially deep
antipathy toward monopoly voiced during the Early Republic. Complaints of Britain’s trade
restrictions, its so-called monopoly of trade, suffused the imperial crisis (Smith 1776, 2:222;
Anon. 1780, 74, 77; Ramsay 1785, 9, 372; Price 1785, 50; Franklin 1794, 161; Winterbotham
1795, 423), particularly the tea troubles (Donoughue 1964, 22). After the Revolution, hatred of
Britain continued unabated, with frequent allusion to her “love of monopoly” (Findley 1794,
107; Baldwin 1903, 464-65). Anything smacking of monopoly was tainted and, in some states,
unconstitutional (Anon. 1790, 89-90). Tennessee’s constitution stipulated “that perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be allowed” and other state
constitutions did likewise (State of Tennessee 1796, 26; A Farmer 1792, 20). In 1787, for14
example, a New Yorker noted that there were two ways “by which a monopoly may be effected;
one proceeding from the authority of the state, and the other by means of an association, which
as it acquires artificial strength from the collective wealth, is enabled to surpass, and eventually
to defeat, the efforts of enterprising individuals.” Because the state “happily denies the power to
sanction a monopoly,” the commentator noted, “the only question that can arise is, how far the
government ought to exercise its power to prevent one” (Anon. 1787a, 2). Some New Yorkers
even sought to amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit the federal government from granting
monopolies (Baldwin 1903, 464).
Monopoly also had dire political implications for early Americans. Perhaps Thomas
Paine summed it up best when he wrote: “As property honestly obtained is best secured by
equality of rights, so ill-gotten property depends for protection on a monopoly of rights. He who
has robbed another of his property, will next endeavour to disarm him of his rights, to secure that
property” (Paine 1795, 26). For many early Americans, corporations smacked too much of
aristocracy, of hereditary privilege (Maier 1993, 66). They saw corporations as permanent
monoliths because they did not yet appreciate the rapid change in ownership that the joint-stock
form and liquid secondary markets made possible. Nor did they yet understand that middling and
poorer sorts could, and would, own corporate equities (Maier 1993, 69-70; Wright 2002).
Distrust of monopoly ran so deep in the 1790s that some Americans opposed patents
because “they conceive them to be monopolies” (Barnes 1792, 27). Learned Vermont jurist
Nathaniel Chipman called “a system of monopoly, one of the greatest evils in civil policy”
(Chipman 1793, 214). While he tolerated them “in a limited degree, for the improvement of arts,
and the encouragement of genius,” New York jurist James Kent also castigated monopolies
because they fostered “inequalities of power and property,” inviting indolence, damping15
enterprise, and facilitating corruption (Kent 1795, 20). Like Smith, Kent also considered
mercantilism a form of monopoly because it gave artificial market power to the center at the
expense of the periphery (Anon. 1798b, xvi-xxiii).
In addition to using “monopoly” to describe restrictive international trading systems like
mercantilism, early Americans used the term to describe domestic market structures. Economists
now think of competition as a spectrum, with perfect Smithian competition at one end and
monopoly at the other. In between lay monopolistic competition, oligopoly, duopoly, contestable
monopolies, and other types of imperfect markets (Lee 1990, 17-31). Early Americans, by
contrast, labeled any market power, anything that was not pure competition, monopoly. They
simply did not have the terminology to express the notion of market power in any other way. Use
of the word monopoly in English dates to at least the sixteenth century. By the mid-eighteenth
century, if not earlier, its meaning in some contexts strayed from the strict definition of the
exclusive possession or control of a good to any persons or groups that could influence price,
quantity, or quality (Rolt 1756, 541-44). Duopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and
market power, by contrast, were not widely used until the twentieth century.
7 The broad
definition of monopoly explains why early Americans regularly used it to describe market
structures that clearly were not characterized by a single dominant firm.
8
When early Americans used the word monopoly they sometimes meant precisely the
same thing we mean by it today, an industry dominated by a single large producer (Bard 1835?,
1). Clearly, however, they sometimes simply meant market power, as evidenced by more
7 Oxford English Dictionary; Hovenkamp 1987-88. Readex’s Archive of Americana, searchable full-text of most
early American newspapers, broadsheets, pamphlets, and books, and Thomson’s Making of the Modern World,
searchable full-text of the Goldsmith-Kress collection, record no valid hits of their use in America prior to 1820.
Monopoly, however, appears in thousands of entries.
8 According to Duer (1819, 14), the following definition of monopoly was “of common use and known import”:
“Monopolies are sole grants of any trade or occupation, or of exclusive privileges, which ought to be common.”16
discerning writers who qualified their use of the term with phrases like “exclusive,” “complete,”
“partial,” “almost,” “principles of,” “spirit of,” “sort of,” “partaking of the nature of,” and so
forth (Hurst 1970, 30, 43; Anon. 1804a, 17). Baker John White, for example, explained to the
Massachusetts legislature that for centuries the number of bakers allowed to bake in Great
Britain had been limited by the bakers themselves.
9 That policy, he argued, was “attended with
the same consequences, as a monopoly, though in a less degree” (White 1791?, 2). An
anonymous writer in 1791 noted that traders could collude to bring “trade near to an open, or at
least a concealed, monopoly.” “They will have momentary power,” he argued, but soon they will
suffer “a weakness as great as their short-lived splendour was dazzling” (Anon. 1791a, 43-44).
Economists today recognize this as a failed attempt to create a cartel. Similarly, Philadelphians
long complained about a law that mandated that all auctions within the city be conducted by a
single vendue master (A Plain Dealer 1786, 2). In 1790, the legislature responded by appointing
a second vendue master. “A Philadelphia Merchant” objected, noting that “this, to be sure, may
be a temporary palliative; but can never effect a radical cure of the evils attendant on a
monopoly of this business. For if a monopoly be dangerous and liable to abuse, the same
objection may be made against confining it to two” (A Philadelphia Merchant 1790, 2).
In early tariff debates, legislators also used monopoly loosely, as economists use the term
market power today. In 1789, for example, George Gale (1756-1815, F-MD) thought a 9 cent
levy on beer too dear because it “would give the brewers here a monopoly.” Thomas Fitzsimons
(1741-1811, F-PA) and Tench Coxe both spoke of breaking the “monopoly” European nations
enjoyed in the Eastern trade (Lloyd 1789, 1:65, 96; Coxe 1792, 23). Similarly, in 1797 “An
Inhabitant” of New York complained that numerous “small grocers and hucksters” monopolized
9 Ireland had a similar institution, designed, the bakers claimed, to ensure they “could obtain a living Profit” (Baker
1756, 4).17
the market for food. “Not a vessel or boat” laden with food, he complained, was “not bought up
in large quantities for the purpose of retail – whereby” consumers were forced to pay “of those
retailers at the advance from 25 to 100 per cent” (An Inhabitant 1796, 3).
More to the point here, critics assailed early U.S. corporations as evil monopolies even
when the institutions sought or obtained nothing close to full market power. Critics often
portrayed banks as monopolies, for example, even as they proliferated and even though they did
not claim the exclusive right to make loans, accept deposits, or even issue notes. Although it
helped America to win its independence by serving as a quasi-central bank during the final phase
of the Revolution, the Philadelphia-based Bank of North America came under intense political
fire that in 1785 led to the revocation of its Pennsylvania charter.
10 Bank critic William Findley
admitted that “whether the bank is a monopoly in the strict legal sense of the word” was an open
question. But “in the common sense,” he claimed, it was “a monopoly, and being so in its nature,
it must be so in its effects.” That made it “inconsistent with not only the frame, but the spirit of
our government.” “By taking advantage of a scarcity of money, which they have it so much in
their power to occasion,” he claimed, the bank’s directors and stockholders “may become sole
lords of the soil” (Anon. 1786b, 3:98). Apparently, like some other early bank critics, Findley
believed the bank could control the money supply and interest rates and hence, to a considerable
degree, land prices (Anon. 1785, 9; Anon. 1827).
The Bank of North America’s founder, merchant-speculator-politician Robert Morris,
retorted that there was no chance that the bank’s stockholders could form a “monopoly” because
they were numerous and diverse and the market for the bank’s stock was active. In fact, he
argued, the bank prevented monopoly in other areas of the economy by extending credit to
10 Massachusetts and New York chartered it in early 1782 but it had no physical operations in either place. Congress
also chartered it but many believed its actions were unconstitutional (Davis 1917, 36-43).18
numerous entrepreneurs. Finally, market forces, not the bank, determined the money supply
(Anon. 1786c, 3; Anon. 1804a, 10; Platt 1811, 5). The Bank of North America won re-charter in
1787 but over time became just one state-chartered commercial bank among many (Davis 1917,
43-44). The problem had never been the bank itself but rather the lack of competition. One critic
of the bank argued that “it will not be denied to be a monopoly, if it has sufficient influence to
make head against all attempts at establishing a similar institution” (Anon. 1786b) an allusion to
a failed attempt to establish another bank in Philadelphia in late 1783 and early 1784 (Davis
1917, 40-42). Rather than destroy the bank, and perhaps the nation’s struggling economy with it,
the solution was to grant additional bank charters. “The establishment of another bank,” many
realized, would produce “a speedy and power influence towards producing” desirable ends, like
a flourishing economy. Competition would squelch the “untowardness of men’s passions” more
readily and thoroughly than direct government regulation could (Citizens 1792).
The Bank of North America’s successor as the national government’s bank, the Bank of
the United States (BUS), also found itself assailed as a monopoly even though it clearly was no
such thing in the strict sense of the term. Even some shareholders of the Bank of North America
called the new bank a monopoly (Webster 1791, 14)! John Taylor claimed that the BUS allowed
a small number of people to monopolize “the bulk of the circulating medium.” Apparently, he
feared the bank would be able to influence both interest rates and the price level by increasing or
decreasing the quantity of money in circulation (Taylor 1794, 11, 73-75, 80). Although the BUS
dwarfed existing banks early on, it steadily lost market share because its capital remained fixed
while state banks multiplied rapidly. Moreover, its monetary liabilities (notes and deposits) were
convertible on demand into gold or silver, firmly tethering the money supply and interest rates to
world markets.19
Nevertheless, claims of the Bank’s monopoly persisted. “Was it necessary that the
advantages arising from the deposits of public money,” William Findley asked, “should be given
as a monopoly to one institution, and government deprived of a competition of proposals?”
(Findley 1794, 78, 93). George Jackson (1757-1831, R-VA) also considered the BUS “a
monopoly of the public monies” (Anon. 1791b, 2:754). In fact, it was not even that because the
Treasury Secretary could and did deposit monies elsewhere for various reasons. But most public
funds went into it and under the broader definition of monopoly then current that was enough.
For the same reason, Peletiah Webster could credibly complain of the “monopoly of bank-
influence in the hands of a few stockholders” of the BUS (Webster 1791, 14).
Disappointed loan applicants who blamed Federalist-controlled banks for extending
discounts based on political preference further fueled claims of monopoly (Anon. 1793, 3; Anon.
1796). In sooth, those denied loans should have blamed excess demand for loans at the
maximum rates allowed by law for their misfortune. After the incorporation of more banks,
including some which lent extensively to Republicans, monopoly charges faded. “A necessary
competition,” one observer claimed after the Manhattan Company began banking operations,
“has annihilated the despotism of banking monopoly” (Philander 1800, 3; Anon. 1800b, 1).
Some non-bank corporations, particularly manufacturing companies, may have also enjoyed
considerable local market power simply due to the high transportation costs that prevailed in
parts of the early nation, particularly the South. In those situations, allowing additional
corporations to form in the affected region provided the necessary relief (Bateman and Weiss
1981, 143-56).
Paradoxically, then, Americans’ morbid fear of monopoly engendered corporation
proliferation, and not only in banking (Maier 1993, 67). In his 1791 report on manufacturers,20
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton claimed that opponents of “the expediency of
encouraging manufactures in the United States” argued that “a virtual monopoly will be given”
to those aided “and an enhancement of price, the inevitable consequence of every monopoly”
would soon follow. Hamilton responded, correctly, that “the internal competition, which takes
place, soon does away every thing like monopoly, and by degrees reduces the price of the article
to the minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed” (Hamilton 1791, 2, 27). That did
not stop George Logan, dressed in the rhetorical garb of “A Farmer,” from arguing in 1792 that
the Society of the Establishment of Useful Manufacturers would injure manufacturing because
no man would “think of giving seven years of the prime of his life to acquire the knowledge of
any profession in which he may be supplanted by a junto of monied men, under the immediate
patronage and protection of Government” (A Farmer 1792, 20). Logan exaggerated, and missed
Hamilton’s point. For the most part, early charters merely enabled corporate entrepreneurs to
compete against other economic entities. Market forces dictated which businesses won and
which lost. Sometimes, as in marine insurance, corporations came out on top. Other times, as in
manufacturing, a variety of business forms persisted for generations.
Early corporations may have enjoyed the presumption of monopoly, as Supreme Court
justice Joseph Story later held, but in fact few charters contained explicit promises of monopoly
rights (Hovenkamp 1988, 1,610; Hurst 1970, 35; Cadman 1949, 224-28). In 1799, New Jersey
granted a corporation the exclusive right to sell maps of the state for 15 years. It clearly thought
of the monopoly as akin to a patent or copyright as the mapmaker’s intellectual property, the
extensive surveys required to create the first copy of the map, could easily be lost to a mere
copyist (New Jersey 1799, 652-54). For similar reasons, bridges and other transportation21
companies were often promised a local monopoly of so many yards or miles for a period of years
in order to protect their capital investment.
In most instances, however, government protection of monopoly rights was neither
necessary nor desired (Davis 1917, 320). Where monopoly was granted, or where a degree of
natural monopoly was thought to exist, state governments regularly capped tolls, interest rates, or
dividends (Cadman 1949, 234-38). Nevertheless, criticism of corporations continued, their
“monopoly” powers associated with special privileges. Corporations “are founded on the right
claimed by government, to confer privileges and immunities on one class of citizens, not only
not enjoyed by the rest, but at the expense of the rest,” Jeffersonian political economist Thomas
Cooper complained (Hovenkamp 1988, 1,634; Gunn 1988, 110-11). Non-corporate firms often
complained bitterly about corporate competition but their complaints were rarely heeded. When
the first chartered marine insurers appeared, for example, premiums dropped, inducing individual
underwriters to protest vigorously. By reducing premiums, one apologist argued, showing little
regard for his clients, the new corporations did nothing but invade “the fair profits of private
industry” (Mercator 1793). State legislators generally refused to arrest progress by giving in to
the cries of those being fairly defeated in the marketplace because it would have been politically
costly for them to do so.
In the nineteenth century, disdain for special privileges and favors dramatically reduced
the cost of obtaining a charter by ushering in the age of general incorporation (Hurst 1970, 30-
34). That anti-corporate angst eventually led to the creation of more corporations should not be
surprising because most Americans hated only other people’s monopolies. Their own
monopolies and corporations were just fine, as evidenced by the fact that many of the people
who wailed against some corporations were stockholders or directors in others (Maier 1993, 52-22
53, 74; Davis 1917, 306-7). “There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our
community,” two jurists noted in the early 1830s, “who is not a member of, at least, one private
company or society which is incorporated” (Angell and Ames 1832, 35).
Governing the Gargantua
From political economist Adam Smith to mining observer George Taylor, critics noted
that internal agency problems within corporations were endemic (Taylor 1833; Hurst 1970, 48).
George Logan argued in 1792 that corporate managers were “uninterested Agents” that
aggrandized themselves at the expense of shareholders (Maier 1993, 72-73). Corporations
certainly faced internal agency problems, but so too did partnerships, especially ones that tried to
achieve large scale. Partners were fully liable for each other’s debts so they had to monitor the
activities of other partners closely. Adding partners added capital but also monitoring costs.
Partnerships coped with that tradeoff the best they could, usually by limiting their size and
number of partners, but at times they succumbed to internal squabbling, shirking, and even theft.
Forewarned of agency internal conflicts, entrepreneurs and legislators were forearmed. As a
result, the governance of early U.S. corporations, although far from perfect, was remarkably
good.
Legislators put some features of early corporate governance into place mainly to protect
the public from potentially rapacious companies. Limitation of corporate charters to a specific
number of years and explicit provision of their right to repeal or amend charters led the list, but
to some extent maximum capitalization, voting rules, and mandatory director rotation also were
thought to protect society from the influence of a few great rich aristocrats (Maier 1993, 75-77;
Hurst 1970, 47; Bonney 1857, 6). Such strictures, however, were also important mechanisms of
internal corporate governance.23
Some early corporate charters provided shareholders with one vote for each share they
owned, respectively, as is typical today. Other charters, however, stipulated that each shareholder
received one vote, regardless of the number of shares he or she owned. Others mandated what
Alexander Hamilton called a “prudent mean,” a voting rule between the extremes of one person,
one vote and one share, one vote. The idea was to balance the power of large and small
shareholders, so that each felt protected from the others. Voting was by secret ballot so
stockholders could exercise their franchise and “avoid the odium and violence of party
prejudice” (Angell and Ames 1832, 195; Coxe 1786, 3-6).
According to historian Colleen Dunlavy (2006, 1,354; 2004, 72-79), under the common
law shareholders received one vote per person unless the corporate charter stipulated otherwise.
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Since most early charters did not discuss voting rules, most corporations provided each
shareholder with one vote, she concludes. As an empirical matter, however, three quarters (238
of 319) of early charters did, in fact, explicitly mandate voting rules. (The other 80 were either
completely silent on matter or were so poorly worded that no determination of the voting rule
could be made with confidence.) About one-third (98) of early charters explicitly granted
shareholders one vote per share without limitation. Approximately 1 in 5 (64) stipulated that
shareholders should receive one vote per share up to some limit, like 5, 10, or 50 votes. About
the same number (67) provided for some prudent mean voting rule. Less than 3 percent (9)
explicitly stipulated one vote per person (Davis 1917, 323; Blandi 1934, 65-66; Cadman 1949,
307-11). Most of those were mutuals that had no shares upon which to base voting rights
11 Dunlavy’s claim rests on Cadman (1949, 307) and Kerbel (1987, 47), both of which rest on a single case, Taylor
v. Griswold (misspelled by Kerbel as Griswald), 14 New Jersey Law (1834), 224. However, Ratner (1970, 3-11)
argues persuasively that the common law had no fixed rule regarding voting rights when they were not made explicit
in corporate charters. The rule apparently held for municipal corporations and other corporations without a capital
stock and hence no shares; the court’s only reference to American law was a flawed inference from Angell and
Ames (1832, 237). Kerbel was aware of Ratner’s article but dismisses it, claiming that Ratner “forms part of a very
limited minority,” without proffering evidence for that claim and without critiquing the article’s substance.24
(Virginia 1788, 19-21). Of the early nation’s 319 corporations, 13 were mutuals, 6 of which
stipulated 1 vote per member, 2 of which provided for 1 vote per policy, and 5 of which were
silent on voting rules. It makes sense that voting in those mutuals would have been based on the
one vote per member or per policy models. But would such a voting scheme have been the
default for joint-stock corporations?
Evidence of Dunlavy’s legal claim is inconclusive. The author of an important 1829
article noted that “it has long been perceived that the common law of corporations was not
adequate to govern these numerous institutions” (Anon. 1829, 94). The authors of the earliest
treatise of U.S. business corporation law did not discuss the issue directly. They did note,
however, that “important changes, both silent and declaratory, have been made in this country as
regards the law of private corporations” (Angell and Ames 1832, vii). In other words, British
common law precedents did not always hold in America de facto, a point to which we shall
return below regarding limited liability. It appears likely that when charters were silent on the
issue of stockholder voting rights the corporate by-laws would control. Some charters, especially
earlier ones, made this quite explicit. Delaware, for example, empowered the directors of the
Bank of Delaware to exercise “such powers, for the well-governing and ordering the said
corporation, and the affairs and business thereof … as have been, or shall be fixed, described and
determined by the rules, laws, regulations, and ordinances of the said corporation” (Delaware
1797, 1,236-39). Similarly, voting rules were explicitly established in the corporate by-laws of
the Sixth Massachusetts Turnpike Corporation, chartered in June 1799. More generally, early
jurists made it clear that “where the mode of electing corporate officers is not prescribed by
charter, or immemorial usage, it may be wholly ordained by by-laws” (Angell and Ames 1832,25
195).
12 Almost without exception, by-laws that were not contrary to the charter or the
constitution or laws of the state of incorporation were valid (Davis 1917, 317).
In a corporation controlled by one or more large interests, minority shareholders could
invoke other means of protection, including calling for third party inquiries into the corporation’s
activities and depressing stock prices by voting with their feet, selling off their shares in one of
the nation’s numerous equities markets (Wright 2002; Wright, Barber, Crafton, and Jain, eds.
2004; Dunlavy 2006, 1,356). Regardless of voting rules, courts generally worked to assure that
stockholder meetings and corporate elections were transparent and fair. They insisted, for
instance, that meetings be adequately advertised, that quorums be achieved before binding
decisions could be made, and that treasury stock (shares owned by the corporation itself) could
not be voted (Dodd 1954, 67-70; Angell and Ames 1832, 69-71).
Moreover, minority stockholders did not need as much protection then as they do now
because charters constrained the activities of early corporations, or to be more precise, their
managers (Hovenkamp 1988, 1,664; Berle and Means 1932, 122), a point upheld by early case
law (Dodd 1954, 42-43; Angell and Ames 1832, 60; Kent 1894, 2:299; Cadman 1949, 318-26).
“If a company be formed … to supply water,” jurist James Kent explained, “the nature of their
business does not raise a necessary implication that they should have power to make notes, and
issue bills; and there must be express authority to enable them to do it” (Kent 1894, 2:300). So
when the Potomack Company ran out of cash in 1799, it turned to its stockholders for ideas
about how to raise more. When their ideas did not produce enough to finish an important series
of locks, the managers suggested increasing the company’s capital by levying an additional $100
on shares that were already fully paid in. Before they could do so, however, they had to win the
12 See also Kent (1894, 2:294), who wrote: “If this be not done to the requisite extent in the act or charter creating
the corporation, it is in the power of the corporation itself, by its by-laws, to regulate the manner of election, and the26
consent of most shareholders, engineer a buyout of holdouts, and obtain legislative approval
(Keith et al. 1799). Similarly, in October 1798 the stockholders of the Middlesex Canal met to
consider whether “the Directors shall be authorized to hire Money to finish the Canal the year
ensuing” (Middlesex Canal 1798). The directors of New York’s canal and lock companies, by
contrast, thought nothing of mortgaging the completed parts of the works to raise cash to finish
its route when stockholders proved reticent to pay for their shares quickly enough (Western and
Northern Inland Lock Navigation Companies 1796, 6). While directors in some companies could
borrow without the explicit approval of stockholders, corporations that offered additional shares
(equity) for sale generally had to offer them to existing stockholders first, so stockholders could
protect their pro rata equity and voting position if they wanted to (Angell and Ames 1832, 312-
15; Berle and Means 1932, 123, 133).
Such restrictions on managerial discretion were important because by the 1790s U.S.
capital markets were quite sophisticated. In 1794, for example, the Schuylkill and Susquehanna
Canal Company issued a convertible preferred stock. Holders were to receive 6 percent per
annum, payable quarterly, plus their proportionate share of any dividends paid to common
stockholders. They also had the option of converting their preferred shares into common stock if
the company issued more of the latter during the 13-year contract period (Anon. 1794).
Rapacious managers (or majority stockholders) could have used such instruments to bilk
investors. Charter restrictions, however, limited the scope of scams as did other requirements,
such as that any major change be approved by stockholders and that dividends be paid out of
operating profit and not capital (Berle and Means 1932, 124, 135).
Stockholder activism also kept managers and majority stockholders in check.
Stockholders in the 1790s did not spend all their waking hours monitoring their investments but
requisite proof of the qualifications of the electors, in conformity with the principles of the charter.”27
they were certainly more activist than investors were in the 1930s, when Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means complained that ownership and control had separated, that managers called the
shots while rationally apathetic shareholders looked on (Wright, Barber, Crafton, and Jain, 2004;
Berle and Means 1932, 76, 112-16). In 1800, for example, stockholders in the Hartford and New
Haven Turnpike monitored management by appointing a committee of three men, Heman Swift,
Epaphroditus Champion, and Jonathan O. Moseley, to inspect the road. The trio dutifully
submitted a detailed 49-point report urging the directors, due to the “immense importance” of the
road, to make improvements like lowering all grades to at least 5 degrees, filling in low-lying
areas, improving drainage, and building up walls and banks (Hartford and New Haven Turnpike
Road Company 1800).
Dividend policies – the presumption was that profits would be paid to stockholders at
regular intervals – also aided in governance by denying managers the means of undertaking self-
serving or untoward activities (Davis 1917, 326). Because they were not supposed to be paid out
of capital, only out of profits, dividends were also important pieces of information for
stockholders and would-be investors (Cadman 1949, 320). Early stockholders could be very well
informed about the status of the corporation if they wished to be. Full public disclosure was a
product of the late twentieth century and was not obviously superior to the early form disclosure
took, which was selective and private. In 1799, for example, the president and directors of the
Potomack Company wrote stockholders a circular letter detailing the company’s
accomplishments, challenges, operations, and financial situation. Tellingly, the directors noted
that they thought it “incumbent” upon themselves to provide stockholders with accurate and
timely information (Keith et al. 1799). It was indeed incumbent upon them to provide
information to stockholders who requested it because they were clearly just the owners’ elected28
agents (Berle and Means 1932, 126). Stockholder rights to information were not unrestricted
(especially in the case of banks) or uniform, but generally stockholders could view the
corporation’s books at frequencies ranging from annually to continuously (Cadman 1949, 319).
Corporations could also go public with information if they wished. In 1792, Philip
Schuyler, president of the Northern and Western Inland Lock Navigation Company, decided he
had to publish the reasons that construction progress on the canal was slow (Schuyler 1793). A
few years later, the company again went public with its troubles, though perhaps more to curry
political favor than to attract additional private investment (Western and Northern Inland Lock
Navigation Companies 1796). Early corporations also often published their charters and by-laws.
The Bank of the United States did so, for example, likely to show potential investors that the
directors had constructed elaborate rules and regulations designed to keep shareholders safe and
big dividends flowing (Bank of the United States 179?). Numerous other companies did
likewise.
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Because early stockholders usually asserted their rights as owners, many early directors
were careful to keep their interests in mind when making important decisions. The directors of
the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Company, for example, declined to enter into a contract with the
state of Pennsylvania to build a canal around Conewago Falls because they thought the risk too
high to impose on their stockholders. So instead they spun off a company specifically organized
to do the work. And good thing, too, as the cost of the locks alone far surpassed the initial
13 Examples include: Bank of Rhode Island, Bank of the United States, Boston Marine Insurance Company,
Company for Opening Inland Navigation Between the Santee and Cooper Rivers, Conewago Canal Company,
Insurance Company of North America, Kennebec Bridge, Lehigh Navigation Company, Locks and Canals Over
Merrimack River, Manhattan Company, Massachusetts Fire Insurance Company, Massachusetts Mutual Fire
Insurance Company, Massachusetts State Bank, Middlesex Canal, Mutual Assurance Company of the City of New
York, Mutual Assurance Company of Philadelphia, Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Boston, New Hampshire
Bank, Newport Insurance Company, New York Insurance Company, Providence Insurance Company, Providence
Mutual Insurance Company, Salem Marine Insurance Company, Sixth Massachusetts Turnpike Company, Stamford29
allowance (Anon. 1798a, 6-7; Western and Northern Inland Lock Navigation Companies 1796,
5-6; Davis 1917, 153).
None of this is to say that early directors were mere marionettes. They could, and did,
push back when stockholders were obviously biased or just plain delusional. For example,
Schuyler patiently explained to shareholders that it would not be prudent to run up expenses
simply because the company’s charter allowed it to make dividends of 15 percent “on all their
expenditures.” “This appears plausible in theory,” he granted, “but may and probably will be
found fallacious on actual experiment” because tolls (to wit, company revenues) would not be
sufficient to pay such high dividends for many years. Tolls would have to be less than the cost of
overland transportation, otherwise the river improvements “would have no beneficial object to
the community” and the area’s population, while growing, would not be sufficient to generate
high revenue for some years. Maintenance expenses also had to be factored in, he noted. He
concluded that completing the improvements “on a scale more extensive than what is
indispensibly [sic] necessary, would be injurious to the reputation of the company” by forcing it
to charge high tolls. “It ought to be the invariable pursuit of the company,” he opined, “so to
conduct its operations as that its interests and those of the community may go hand in hand”
(Anon. 1792, 15-16).
In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, some corporate managers discovered
ways of circumventing the early corporate governance safeguards discussed above. Some
economically disruptive financial panics and high-profile business failures resulted but so too did
countermeasures that were effective at least for a time (Kamensky 2008; Hilt 2008, 2009).
Maintaining close alignment of the incentives of stockholders, managers, and society remains a
Mutual Insurance Company, Susquehanna Canal, Warren Insurance Company, and Washington Insurance
Company.30
challenge to this day (Acharya and Richardson 2009). Nevertheless, then as now it appears that
many more corporations succumbed to competitive pressures and recessions than to managerial
malfeasance.
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The Benefits of Big
Big businesses suffered from internal agency problems, but, as discussed above, not
intractable ones. Large size also brought big benefits, including market power (control over input
costs and output prices), economies of scale (horizontal integration leading to the lower per unit
costs typically associated with larger production facilities), and vertical integration (including
more of the production and distribution process within the business, rather than purchasing
inputs or distribution services in the market). Each strategy required that businesses grow to a
large size relative to traditional firms. Although proprietorships and partnerships occasionally
grew to great size, it was costly for them to do so. Proprietors had to generate equity capital
themselves. They could borrow but usually only for short periods and rarely for more than a few
years. Bonds and mortgages could run for decades, but after a year or two they usually became
callable, to the great risk of the borrower. Moreover, creditors frowned upon highly leveraged
operations due to interest rate and, in this pre-life insurance environment, mortality and
morbidity risks. Unless they controlled their own banks, few entrepreneurs would or could
venture big by borrowing or by using only their own funds and those of a few close compatriots
(Lamoreaux 1994; Heath 1954, 322). Large size almost demanded incorporation. “The
multiplication of corporations, and the avidity with which they are sought,” wrote Kent, “have
14 More research in this area is warranted. Suffice it to say here that there were no major corporate governance
failures until the few small banks described by Kamensky (2008).31
arisen in consequence of the power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over
business of every kind” (Kent 1894, 2:271-72).
Corporate market power sometimes flowed directly from government decree. More often,
however, it stemmed from relative size and an early form of branding. The Beverly Cotton
Manufactory, for example, obtained a trademark for its seal, which it affixed to its products like
its soon famous Beverly corduroys (Davis 1917, 271-72). After the Bank of Alexandria
organized and launched successful operations it appealed to the state legislature not for exclusive
banking privileges in Northern Virginia but rather for an increase of its capital and for the right
to issue notes of less than $5 denomination for the “convenience of the planters, farmers, and
mechanicks,” especially in “country places” where small change was often in short supply. Small
notes earned seigniorage but also spread the bank’s name and fame far and wide (Herberts et al.
1793).
To attract large sums of capital, long-term or “locked in” debt and equity, entrepreneurs
turned to the corporate form, which offered investors five major advantages over other types of
organization (Blair 2003, 387-455; Hurst 1970, 44). First and foremost, corporations enjoyed
perpetual succession (Williston 1888, 117; Kent 1894, 2:268). That did not mean that
corporations were guaranteed to survive forever or even that their charters extended to the end of
days. In fact, a few early corporate charters were perpetual but most were limited to a specific
number of years (Livermore 1935, 676-77; Angell and Ames 1832, 4, 501-14). Also, in most
states, corporations could dissolve of their own accord (Angell and Ames 1832, 507-10). Rather,
succession meant that shareholders and managers could come and go without forcing the
dissolution of the enterprise, that “the body continues the same, notwithstanding the change of
the individuals who compose it” (Maier 1993, 54; Angell and Ames 1832, 1, 21, 58-59).32
Succession provided a big advantage over partnerships, which had to dissolve and re-form
whenever a partner joined or left the firm. It was also advantageous in some lines of business
where customers had to account for the mortality, morbidity, and credit risks posed by sole
proprietors. During the 1790s, for example, incorporated marine insurance companies
increasingly took market share away from old style brokers, making particularly rapid gains
during the Quasi-War against France. Corporations were more likely to pay claims than
individuals because they had larger capitals and were more robust in the face of shocks like
yellow fever epidemics. Moreover, they proved just as good as individual underwriters at
combating adverse selection and moral hazard, the two great banes of insurers (Kingston 2007).
Corporations were also afforded the presumption of state non-interference. Those that did
not begin operations in a prompt manner could have their charters revoked by the government
after due process. Sometimes charters explicitly specified how long the corporation had to begin
operations; other times, the matter was left up to later negotiation (Angell and Ames 1832, 510-
12; Kent 1894, 2:312; Davis 1917, 227). In no instance countenanced by early jurisprudence,
however, could government capriciously seize, terminate, or substantially alter the charter of a
business corporation unless it explicitly reserved the right to do so in the charter (Hovenkamp
1988, 1,659-60; Dodd 1954, 26-28; Angell and Ames 1832, 504; Kent 1894, 2:306). The glaring
exception, Pennsylvania’s revocation of the Bank of North America’s charter, was never tested
in court because the bank was satisfied to secure a new, albeit less generous, act of incorporation
in 1787. Massachusetts took the less objectionable path of modifying the charter of its first bank,
the Massachusetts Bank, over time as it became clear that the original charter was not up to best
practices (Dodd 1954, 201-202; Davis 1917, 43, 310-13).33
Second, a corporation could also sue and be sued in its own name (Angell and Ames
1832, 207-36). (In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, corporation names were more
flexible than today. As Angell and Ames noted, “the name of a corporation, frequently consists
of several words, and the transposition, interpolation, omission, or alteration of some of them
may make no essential difference in their sense” [Angell and Ames 1832, 55, 123].) Thanks to a
New York Supreme Court decision in 1799, corporations could sue without exhibiting their
charters or listing the names of shareholders (Angell and Ames 1832, 382). Subsequent jurists
deftly dodged some legal niceties about the definition of “person” and “citizen” to ensure
corporations close to full and equal access to federal courts and courts in states where the
corporation was not domiciled (Dodd 1954, 35-41, 48-57). That made it cheaper for a
corporation to collect debts owed to it than a similarly sized co-partnership, which had to sue in
the name of all partners. To sue or be sued the partnership needed the active participation of all
the principals, which was often inconvenient and always costly. Partly for that reason, most early
American partnerships had four or fewer members, usually all resident in the same city, and
often related by birth or marriage.
15 All else constant, creditors also recovered debts from
corporations more easily than they could from partnerships (Sylla and Wright 2003, 1:xii-lii).
Of course, all else was not always, or even usually, constant. Corporations were much
more likely to extend limited liability to its owners than partnerships were. Limited liability, the
third great advantage of the corporate form, ostensibly injured corporations’ ability to borrow but
greatly aided its ability to attract equity financing (Manne 1967, 262; Baskin and Miranti 1997,
139). The unique structure of the primary or issuance market for shares constituted the fourth
15 “It is uncommon for a partnership to consist of more than three or four individuals; two is the most usual number”
(Anon. 1829, 110). See also Hilt and O’Banion (2009).34
advantage of the corporate form, and the creation and perpetuation of active secondary markets
in corporate equities was the fifth. All three receive more detailed discussion below.
Limited Liability and Entity Shielding
In only two cases, the Hamilton Manufacturing Society of New York and the Salem Iron
Factory Company of Massachusetts, did early charters mandate full stockholder liability (Davis
1917, 279, 318). In the Maryland Insurance Company, stockholders were made proportionally
liable for the corporation’s debts. (In other words, if a shareholder owned 10 percent of the
outstanding shares when the company went bankrupt, he or she would have to pay 10 percent of
any of its debts remaining unpaid after its assets had been liquidated.) In their classic article on
the origins of the business corporation, Oscar and Mary Handlin baldly assert that corporate
charters by default mandated full stockholder liability. In other words, unless a charter explicitly
provided otherwise, in the event of corporate bankruptcy creditors could recover all they were
due from any stockholder or stockholders. Since most early charters did not contain an explicit
clause limiting shareholder liability (Blandi 1934, 39; Cadman 1949, 327) (16 expressly
provided unqualified limited liability for shareholders while another 16 imposed full liability on
directors and/or shareholders only if certain financial ratios were exceeded), the Handlins
reasoned, limited liability must have been of only “slight importance” to early stockholders
(Handlin and Handlin 1945, 8-10).
More recent research questions the Handlins’ analysis. According to the new view,
stockholder liability in the early United States was limited de facto. In other words, unless
explicitly altered by statute, investors and observers widely considered shareholder liability to be
limited to the par value of the stock owned by each (Arner 2002, 53-56; Dodd 1954, 66, 84-93;
Perkins 1994, 373-76; Moss 2002, 59; Heath 1954, 316; Anon. 1829, 104). Bank historian Bray35
Hammond (1957, 654) put it best when he wrote: “The exemption of stockholders from personal
liability became established in subterranean fashion with almost no formal advocacy and with
very little formal recognition.” Contemporaries also understood that, unless their charters
explicitly provided otherwise, corporations could not assess stockholders for more than the par
value of their shares so liability for solvent corporations was inherently limited (Angell and
Ames 1832, 302-3). Moreover, the Handlins themselves admitted that whatever its legal status,
liability was not tested in the courts because most early corporations did not impose losses on
creditors (Handlin and Handlin, 1945, 16-17; Hurst 1970, 51; Davis 1917, 294). Legal scholar
Edwin Dodd (1954, 12) concurred, noting that reported case law on corporations in America
prior to 1800 was extremely scanty. After several corporations failed following the War of 1812,
courts finally definitively ruled that absent an explicit charter clause to the contrary, the limited
liability of stockholders was assumed. Thereafter, limited liability clearly became ensconced in
the American corporate scene. In Massachusetts, Georgia and some other states, however,
double, treble, proportional, and even full liability for shareholders in certain types of
corporations, sometimes banks but more often mining and manufacturing companies, was often
explicitly mandated (Hovenkamp 1988, 1,651-56; Howard 1938; Livermore 1935; Dodd 1954,
364-437; Angell and Ames 1832, 357-64; Cadman 1949, 325; Heath 1954, 316-21; Anon., 1829,
95-102).
Evidence supporting the new view of de facto limited liability in the 1790s abounds.
When commenting on the repeal of the charter of the Bank of North America, Robert Whitehill
noted that he was “not surprised” the stockholders were “so solicitous to procure another charter
for the bank. While it has no charter, their private circumstances are liable to account for any
deficiencies” (Anon. 1786a, 3:95). The Bank apparently agreed, obtaining a charter from36
Delaware, just in case (Baldwin 1903, 459; Davis 1917, 11, 43). Before it received the official
sanction of the state, the Bank of New York had some difficulties attracting investors who feared
that they could be held personally responsible for the bank’s debts should it fail.
16 In 1793,
“Mercator” argued against the incorporation of a marine insurer on the grounds that the
stockholders would receive limited liability, a gift that would provide it unfair advantage over
individual underwriters. America’s earliest corporate law treatise unequivocally stated that “no
rule of law” was “better settled, than that, in general, the individual members of a private
corporate body are not liable for the debts, either in their persons or in their property, beyond the
amount of property which they have in the stock” (Angell and Ames 1832, 349). Adam Smith
also unequivocally noted that in partnerships “each partner is bound for the debts contracted by
the company to the whole extent of his fortune” but in a joint-stock corporation “each partner is
bound only to the extent of his share” (Smith 1937, 699). “The estate and rights of a corporation
belong so completely to the body,” a nineteenth century commentator argued, “that none of the
individuals who compose it can dispose of any part of them.” Therefore, the commentator
continued, “what is due to the corporation is not due to any of the individuals who compose it,
and vice versa” (Glenn 1846, 511).
Early widespread adoption of limited liability (de facto or de jure) helped the U.S.
economy to steer clear of a trap that ensnared the British economy in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. Corporate creditors disliked limited liability because it limited the pool of
income and assets from which they could demand repayment. They responded by insisting that
directors or prominent shareholders pledge their personal estates as well or by charging a risk
premium on corporate bonds. In the United States, most corporate shareholders enjoyed de facto
16 Alexander Hamilton’s attempt to build limited liability into the bank’s articles of association was never tested
because the bank never failed. In fact, it still operates today.37
limited liability, so those who wished to lend to American corporations had little recourse.
Competition among lenders kept risk premiums or demands for personal collateral low; there
was no presumption that a company with limited liability was weak. In Great Britain, by
contrast, corporations could choose their liability status. Higher quality firms typically chose full
liability while lower quality ones typically chose limited liability, or so bond investors widely
believed. Full liability corporations therefore found it much cheaper to borrow than limited
liability ones did, inducing many firms to maintain their full liability status and raising the cost
of capital for others, whether justly or not. That may explain in part why Britain’s economy
lagged behind that of the United States and other countries where limited liability developed and
proliferated more rapidly (Nosal and Smart 2007).
Scholars sometimes argue that limited liability merely transferred risk to creditors. It
certainly did; that was the point. Those scholars go too far, however, when they conclude that
limited liability was inconsequential. It actually reduced risk. Lenders and other creditors were
senior to stockholders and their liability, as it were, was always limited to the amount of their
loan. In other words, in case of default or bankruptcy they had first dibs on the corporation’s
assets and had no fear of being called on for more. With full liability, each shareholder had to
worry about paying all of the corporation’s debts, however remote that possibility might be.
Buying a share with full liability was a bit like buying a lottery ticket where one might by chance
draw the obligation of paying off the winner! Not many people would prize such a dubious
opportunity (Anon. 1829, 105-7, 115-16). Limited liability leveled the playing field.
Stockholders were still junior; they bore the residual risk of bankruptcy. With limited liability,
however, they no longer had to factor in the probability of losing all their assets. That
undoubtedly had a large, positive impact on share demand and liquidity, lowering the cost of38
equity capital (Angell and Ames 1832, 23-24, 371-72). Limited liability was therefore a Pareto
improvement because it made some groups better off (stockholders, the corporation itself) while
rendering no one worse off (because creditors were free to increase the cost of credit to reflect
limited liability).
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Limited liability protected shareholders when a corporation failed. Entity shielding, by
contrast, protected the corporation from the bankruptcy of one or more of its stockholders and,
by extension, protected shareholders from each other. Thanks to entity shielding, neither the
corporation nor its shareholders needed to know or care about the identity of its investors. That,
in turn, allowed corporations to accept anyone who bought their stock without vote or cavil
(Angell and Ames, 1832, 62, 239). That, of course, increased the liquidity of equities and hence
demand for them both at the time of issuance (the primary market) and thereafter (the secondary
market). Partnerships also enjoyed some entity shielding but the corporate shield was much more
robust (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire 2006; Bodenhorn 2006).
Primary Markets
Most early U.S. corporations were start-ups, new companies with little or no operational
history (Davis 1917, 33). Early corporate entrepreneurs were able to go public before beginning
operations for four reasons. First, even the nation’s largest cities were geographically and
socially compact. Entrepreneurs and potential investors knew each other, often quite well, or at
least knew of each other. In fact, most early corporate securities sales were direct public
offerings (DPOs) rather than initial public offerings (IPOs). In other words, corporations sold
securities directly to the public, not via investment banks. To do so, they advertised the time and
17 The only exception would be involuntary creditors, like tort victims, but such cases were rare in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. They are more common today but are probably best handled through other, possibly
government-sponsored, means (Moss 2002, 74-75, 81, 84).39
place of subscription, and sometimes their general business plans, by word of mouth, broadsides,
and newspaper advertisements.
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Second, DPOs were largely unregulated, allowing entrepreneurs to engage in selective
disclosure, as in private placements today. Selective disclosure mitigated one of the major costs
of full disclosure public offerings. Some investors could learn important details of the business
plan while others, suspected competitors, were told little, perhaps only the names of the people
who had already subscribed (Manne 1967, 260). Entrepreneurs were loath to withhold that
information because a list of good names could jumpstart demand as smaller investors looked to
follow the “smart” money. “From the respectability of the characters who already subscribed,” a
New York paper noted of a 1792 canal DPO, “we have reason to congratulate our fellow-citizens
in the prospect of the respective subscriptions being speedily and substantially filled.” The paper
was a little too sanguine but the number of subscriptions did jump despite the monetary
stringency caused by the Panic of 1792 (Davis 1917, 160-63).
Third, a culture of activist corporate governance, prudent mean stockholder voting rules,
and legal restrictions against corporate activities that served to mitigate agency problems
protected the rights of minority stockholders. Early corporations clearly wanted, and needed, all
of the equity investment they could get. Strong protection of the rights of small stockholders,
many of whom were women, minors, and men of middling means, was therefore paramount.
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Fourth, early U.S. corporations in their DPOs typically sold de facto call options on
shares rather than the shares themselves (Dodd 1954, 74). Subscribers initially made a down
payment, as low as a dollar or two per share. The Bank of Rhode Island, for example, took at
18 For examples of printed advertisements of general business plans, see Anon. 1782?; Thomson and Morris 1781;
Anon., 1799, 19-20. For an example of personal solicitation of stock, see Appleton (1858, 8).
19 “A corporation may consist of both men and women, provided, its institution is not repugnant to the condition and
modesty of women” (Angell and Ames 1832, 51 n1). See also Wright (2000, 2002, 2008).40
subscription just $5 for every $200 par value share (Rhode-Island Bank 1795, 2). After the
company organized, corporate officers called in all or part of the par value of the share in
installments. The $10, $25, $50, $100, or $1,000 par value per share was not fully paid in until
some weeks, months, or years after the corporation began business, giving investors some idea of
its operations before they were “all in.” The Middlesex Canal, for example, called in its capital
stock in 100 different assessments ranging from $2.50 to $10 per share (Davis 1917, 172).
Subscribers usually could walk away by selling their options to other investors.
20 The most
(in)famous of these markets for “scrip” was that of the Bank of the United States. The
subscription in any joint-stock corporation was tradable but not necessarily easily so if money
market conditions tightened or the company faced operational difficulties (Davis 1917, 52, 60-
61, 80). If no buyer could be found, subscribers generally could forfeit their shares (Angell and
Ames 1832, 327). Directors had considerable discretion regarding when and if they called for
installments and what happened to shareholders who did not pay up. The directors of the Charles
River Bridge, for example, gave 15 days’ grace after which it levied interest at “Five per Cent.
per Month.” After 4 months, unpaid shares “and all the Monies he has before advanced” were
forfeited to the corporation (Austin 1785). It was extremely difficult, however, for corporations
to force subscribers to pay for their shares, hence the de facto call option nature of the obligation
(Angell and Ames 1832, 293-302).
Unincorporated joint-stock associations selling de facto options faced legal barriers. They
could not sue delinquent members because courts saw them as both a plaintiff and a defendant;
members could voluntarily withdraw from the association (Dodd 1954, 66, 80). Chartered
companies, by contrast, could and did sue subscribers who missed installment payments on their
20 See, for example, the stock transfer ledgers of the Upper Appommatox Company, Virginia Historical Society,
especially the transfer from John Hurt to Henry Moss on 20 May 1797 and the transfer from Thomas Read to John41
shares when they formally agreed to pay all their installments on time or suffer explicit penalties
(Dodd 1954, 65-66). When faced by a mass defection of stockholders, the Delaware and
Schuylkill Canal Company asked the courts to enforce just such an agreement. The directors and
leading stockholders (presumably those who had fully paid up) argued that share forfeiture
would not serve the company because its works were already well underway. “All those
immense sums of money, already advanced will be totally lost,” they argued, “and the wreck of
the canal, exhibit a lasting monument of folly; and even prevent other enterprises worthy of great
minds.” They seemed to worry about their ability to collect, however, so they also argued that if
delinquent stockholders would only examine the canal’s affairs they would see that the
investment was still solid (Anon. 1800a, 8). When some still refused to pay, Pennsylvania courts
upheld forfeiture of shares purchased in the secondary market and fines for original subscribers
(Dodd 1954, 75-76; Angell and Ames 1832, 310). Similarly, work on an early New York canal
halted when stockholders failed to meet directors’ calls “either because they had not the means to
supply such advances, or from an apprehension of the impracticability of succeeding in the
operation.” An infusion of government funds bolstered confidence in the project, however, and
the canal was eventually completed (Western and Northern Inland Lock Navigation Companies
1796, 3).
Assured that they could sell their shares for a fair market price whenever they needed too,
early Americans usually purchased share options in DPOs with alacrity, providing corporations
with the equity capital that they needed to commence and continue large scale operations (Davis
1917, passim).
Haskins on 15 January 1803.42
Secondary Markets
Liquidity of ownership stakes was another advantage because it allowed stockholders to
increase, decrease, or maintain their holdings in specific enterprises as they saw fit and to borrow
money by posting shares as collateral (Manne 1967, 264; Heath 1954, 319, 322). Liquidity also
provided stockholders with the opportunity to “vote with their feet.” Selling out freed individual
investors from situations they did not like and, if enough shareholders felt similarly, decreased
share prices and hence the cost of takeover by a new control group (Manne 1967, 265-66). Most
judges realized this and generally used the power of the bench to ensure the full and easy
transferability of corporate shares (Banner 1998, 230-36; Dodd 1954, 114-20; Angell and Ames
1832, 316-48). Thanks to those rules, equities of major corporations, including the Bank of the
United States, traded in European capital markets like London (Angell and Ames 1832, 326;
Sylla, Wilson, and Wright 2006). Courts also made it relatively easy for people to hypothecate
equities or, in other words, to use them as collateral for loans.
Corporate securities ownership was not limited to the rich, or even the well-to-do. Many
people of middling means bought a share or two in local banks, turnpikes, and other corporate
enterprises (Baldwin 1903, 463; Banner 1998, 129-30). Most early U.S. corporations had scores
or hundreds, rather than just a few shareholders. Ninety-one different people invested in the
Charles River Bridge in 1785; 50 different people purchased the 120 shares offered in the
Malden Bridge Company in 1787 (Charles River Bridge Company 1785; Anon. 1787b). At one
point in the 1790s, 309 different entities, mostly individuals but also a few corporations,
partnerships, and non-profit organizations, owned shares in the Bank of Pennsylvania (Bank of
Pennsylvania 179?).
In a few cases, surviving corporate records allow us to detail changes in stock ownership
(Wright 2002; Davis 1917, 300). In other cases, the existence of liquid secondary markets can be43
inferred with confidence from the regular publication of stock prices in contemporary
newspapers (Sylla, Wilson, and Wright n.d.). Finally, we know from the large size and frequent
trading of U.S. government bonds that the financial infrastructure requisite to trade any corporate
security – brokers, dealers, exchanges, and the like – were in place by the early 1790s (Wright
2008; Wright n.d.).
Corporations and Economic Growth
A vigorous spirit of enterprise was not unknown in colonial America (Doerflinger 1986),
but it was much more muted and limited than the spirit of entrepreneurship that swept the nation,
including even agrarian Virginia, after passage of the Constitution (Crothers 1999). Part of the
spirit stemmed from the realization that Americans needed services, particularly financial ones,
no longer easily available from Britain (Dodd 1954, 196-97). Another part arose from the
improved protection of property rights afforded under the Constitution (Wright 2008). Much of
the new entrepreneurial spirit gravitated toward relatively large scale projects. “Not until the new
government under our present Constitution came into active operation in the spring of 1789,”
wrote historian Simeon Baldwin (1903, 449-50) over a century ago, “was a fair field open for the
permanent investment of capital in large operations with the assurance of safety as could
command general public confidence.”
Some large scale enterprises could be successfully undertaken without creating a
corporation. Not all toll bridges were owned and operated by corporations, for example.
Numerous bridges in Virginia were owned and operated by proprietorships or partnerships. In
New Jersey in 1791, the government auctioned off the right to build bridges and collect tolls over
the Passaic and Hackensack rivers to the highest bidder, the person or firm that would accept the
shortest lease period (Tuthill 1791). Interestingly, however, some of those firms later44
incorporated and New Jersey later chartered numerous bridge companies (Davis 1917, 207;
Cadman 1949, 44-45). Similarly, a small group of entrepreneurs in South Carolina discovered it
was far too expensive for them to clear Pine Tree Creek as thoroughly as they hoped. In order to
finish the project, they prayed to be incorporated so that investors could be “admitted upon equal
and safe terms.” The legislature agreed, giving rise to the Pine Tree Creek Navigation Company
in late 1797 (South Carolina 1797, 129-132). Entrepreneurs heading up larger enterprises,
including larger bridges and river improvements, knew from the start that they needed to
incorporate in order to attract enough long-term capital to make a go of it. Without the corporate
form, entrepreneurs would have been forced to find more costly ways of raising capital or to
forego larger or riskier projects completely.
Entrepreneurs did not generally risk their time, reputation, fortunes, and, in an age of
debtors’ prisons their freedom, without the prospect of considerable gain. Large projects held out
two inducements to early entrepreneurs, market power and scale economies, which combined
spelled the opportunity for large profits (high prices coupled with low costs). While
entrepreneurs struggled to grow rich, Adam Smith’s invisible hand took over, rendering their
selfish greed socially beneficial as they created new technologies, developed new industries, and
made production processes more efficient. Taking a broader view, the rise of the corporation
nation helped to ensure that the United States developed and maintained a system of “good
capitalism,” a healthy mix of smaller startups and efficient, well-established industrial giants.
While not without its flaws, such a system is far better for economic growth, and hence
individuals and their governments, than the various forms of “bad capitalism” that flourished
elsewhere (Baumol, Litan, and Schramm 2007).45
Modern management is generally considered a product of the second half of the
nineteenth century. That may be true, but already by the 1790s corporate managers were learning
how to run large enterprises efficiently (Cochran 1974), some by applying experience gained on
the larger plantations and manors (Kamoie 2007, 136-40). After some initial difficulties, banks
by 1800 were generally very well managed (Davis 1917, 34-108; Bodenhorn 2000, 2002). Less
is known about the management of insurance companies but there is little reason to question
their competence (Davis 1917, 231-46). They were astute enough, for example, to urge state and
local governments to construct lighthouses, install navigation buoys, and pass basic fire safety
legislation (U.S. Treasury Department 1798). Bankers and insurers made mistakes to be sure but
anyone conversant with recent events knows that they remain far from infallible (Acharya and
Richardson 2009).
Canals and turnpikes were often completed late and over budget, but that is not
uncommon even today (LePatner, Jacobson, and Wright 2007). Early canal and turnpike
companies often made a hash of things for two main reasons. First, large-scale construction
experts, particularly experienced engineers, were few. At least two of those who emigrated from
Europe, John Senf and Pierre L’Enfant, were more like artsy architects than solid civil engineers
(Davis 1917, 144-45; Wright 2009). Second, laborers, even the unskilled, were expensive and
uppity, and supervision was often lax (Davis 1917, 126). Even though they paid efficiency
wages, the Potomac Company found that its laborers manifested a “turbulent and insubordinate
spirit” so strong that “the work that was directed to be done was either entirely omitted or but
partially performed.” Attempts to bolster the labor force with indentured servants and slaves
backfired as tensions between the three types of laborers mounted and many servants fled.
Gunpowder began to go missing and neighbors complained of ill treatment (Davis 1917, 127-46
28). Conditions eventually improved on that and other projects but labor-management difficulties
persisted.
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When things got tough, early American managers tended to squabble amongst themselves
rather than work together to fix the problem. On the Potomac canal, for example, the assistant
managers regularly bickered, quarreled, and hurled insults at each other in an apparent attempt to
curry favor with the company’s directors (Davis 1917, 129-30). Early managers usually learned
on the job, but they did learn. Instead of repeating the woes of the Potomac Company, the James
River Company used slaves exclusively or contracted jobs out to smaller firms (Davis 1917, 137-
40).
Cost estimation techniques, though still primitive by later standards, also improved with
experience. The Cooper and Santee River canal in South Carolina ended up costing three times
its original estimate (Davis 1917, 146). Such overruns prompted one early observer to advise
doubling engineer estimates “in order to provide against contingencies” (Anon. 1798, 7).
Another committee explained that “in works of this kind [canal construction] where many men
are employed, worthless characters will introduce themselves notwithstanding every attention to
prevent it; accidents will intervene, tending to retard the business.” It therefore padded its cost
estimate of £72,350 by £7,650, which was a little more than the 10 percent padding suggested by
experienced British engineer William Weston (Western and Northern Inland Lock Navigation
Companies 1796, 20). Perhaps more importantly, the committee noted that tolls would be less
than the “market rate of interest” (approximately 7 percent) on £80,000 so “the Stockholders will
be sufferers” unless the legislature cut the company some slack regarding the width and depth of
21 Some readers, especially those of a theoretical bent, may wonder how a firm could pay efficiency wages but still
end up with unwilling workers. The key, of course, was poor management. Workers, like other people, will try to get
away with as much as possible. If managers are unable or unwilling to monitor workers and fire shirkers, the wage
level will be immaterial to worker productivity.47
the canal (Northern Inland Lock Navigation Company 1792, 12-14). Architects also warned of
massive cost overruns, “especially in buildings of a public nature” (Kamensky 2008, 108).
Early directors had some idea about how to keep expenses down. A committee of the
Western Inland Lock Navigation Company, for example, realized that it needed to delegate
considerable operational power to a single strong manager, someone who could engage in
comprehensive planning so “that supplies may be prepared, without incurring that extra expence
which ever attends collections made on the spur of the occasion.” “To find such a character,” the
committee admitted, “is certainly not very easy” but at least they were looking (Schuyler 1792,
19; Davis 1917, 162-63). The Middlesex Canal Company apparently found one because its
extensive works – over 27 miles of canal, 20 locks, 7 aqueducts, and over two score bridges –
came in only slightly over budget, despite the fact that like many early canals it at first built
economically inefficient wooden locks instead of more expensive but much more durable stone
ones (Davis 1917, 172-73).
After much time and expense, some canal companies eventually got the job done,
bestowing the benefits of cheaper and faster transportation to the farmer, merchant, and
manufacturer alike. By 1799, for example, the Potomac Company had made it possible for boats
laden with 100 barrels of flour to navigate the Potomac River from George’s Creek to the
tidewater with only a single portage around the Great Falls (Keith et al. 1799). The canal at
Conewago Falls in Pennsylvania also worked well when finally completed, reducing the amount
of time it took to negotiate the falls fully laden from many hours and dollars to about a half an
hour (Anon. 1798a, 6-7; Western and Northern Inland Lock Navigation Companies 1796, 5-6).
By 1800, the James River Company had improved the navigation of its namesake some 45 miles.
By 1816 that figure had grown to 300 miles, at the cost of only $1,200 per mile, a figure low48
enough to allow it to pay handsome dividends (Davis 1917, 139-40). From South Carolina to
Massachusetts, other canals, most owned and operated by corporations, eventually opened for
business, greatly aiding the size and efficiency of local and regional markets (Rothenberg 1992).
Bridges usually fared quite well. Even the large ones typically constructed by
corporations were easy to build and manage relative to canals. (Smaller ones were handled by
local road crews, individual proprietors, turnpikes, and so forth.) Damaging floods and ice were
their biggest foes. Like canals, bridges aided the economy and improved market efficiency by
lowering transaction costs. Far better to traverse a bridge than to ford an icy river or wait for the
ferryman, especially along important thoroughfares like the York road that connected Manhattan
to Philadelphia via New Jersey (Davis 1917, 186-215).
Far better, too, to travel a well kempt turnpike than rutty local roads. Larger and more
difficult to construct and keep in good repair than bridges but easier to build and maintain than
canals, turnpikes not surprisingly generally suffered more financial, engineering, labor and other
problems than bridges but fewer than canals. Most new turnpikes successfully raised cash via
DPOs, completed their roads, and remained in business for decades. Some were financially
successful, but many found it difficult to collect enough tolls to cover the cost of road repair and
gatekeepers (Davis 1917, 216-227, 292-93).
Some early manufacturers also struggled. Management and labor difficulties plagued the
Society for the Establishment of Useful Manufacturers, for example, eventually bringing it to its
financial knees. But it later recovered and other manufacturers got on well from the start.
America in 1800 was still a nation of farms and plantations but industrial output was growing
fast and would continue to do so throughout the nineteenth century (Davis 2004). Many
manufacturing concerns were still small, ranging from a corner of a farmhouse with a spinning49
wheel or a small nail forge to a mill employing a dozen hands. Much of the growth in
manufacturing, however, was aided by corporations (Davis 1917, 255-82). Growth in other
modern sectors, including mining, transportation, and financial services, was also largely
attributable to the net benefits entrepreneurs discovered, laying mostly latent, in a hoary
institution inherited from the Old World.
22 By 1801, thousands of entrepreneurs interested in
pursuing relatively complex, large-scale, and long-term projects found that the benefits of the
corporate form outweighed the costs of obtaining a charter and aligning the incentives of
stockholders, employees, and other stakeholders. By the Civil War, over 100,000 more
calculated likewise. Some corporations sputtered and failed but others created the machines,
transportation networks, and financial and other services that ultimately transformed the U.S.
economy into the world’s largest and most dynamic.
22 Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2003) miss America’s crucial contribution to corporation formation and
proliferation. Contemporary foreigner observers, by contrast, knew that America was the original corporation nation
(Murat 1833, 337-38).50
Table 1: Corporations Chartered Before 1801
Colonial
1776-
1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 Totals
Jurisdiction
Connecticut 2 1 0 0 3 0 0 7 2 9 9 2 9 44
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Maryland 0 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 3 0 4 1 0 21
Massachusetts 1 5 0 1 8 5 5 8 11 15 8 7 7 81
National 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
New
Hampshire 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 8 3 4 1 3 3 29
New Jersey 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 2 0 3 2 12
New York 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 3 6 7 5 27
North Carolina 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 9
Pennsylvania 2 1 0 1 2 5 3 1 2 1 4 0 0 22
Rhode Island 3 0 0 1 2 0 3 1 1 0 0 2 7 20
South Carolina 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 2 0 10
Vermont 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 4 0 4 5 18
Virginia 0 6 0 0 2 1 1 6 1 0 2 0 1 20
Totals 8 21 3 9 27 15 17 40 31 41 35 33 39 319
Type
Banks 0 2 1 3 8 3 0 5 2 0 0 2 3 29
Bridge 0 3 0 1 10 6 7 13 6 14 6 3 2 71
Canal 0 12 1 3 7 5 2 8 12 5 5 3 2 65
Insurance –
Fire 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 1 3 0 1 14
Insurance –
Marine 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 3 5 5 19
Manufacturing 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 7
Mapping 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Mining 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Pier/wharf 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
Trading 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Turnpike 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 6 6 10 11 15 21 73
Viticulture 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Water utility 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 8 6 4 4 32
Totals 8 21 3 9 27 15 17 40 31 41 35 33 38 319
Note: I count original charters only, not laws reviving existing charters or laws that merely
validate corporations already chartered by another state. I was able to verify almost all of the
charters found by Davis (1917). I include one organization that he dismissed as a charity but
removed another (very charity-like) organization that he believed to be a for-profit corporation. I
found one turnpike in Connecticut not listed in Davis. Future research may uncover additional51
charters but it is highly unlikely that any significant number of business corporations chartered
prior to 1801 have been missed. Of the 319 business corporations tracked in the table above, I
found positive evidence that 15 of them never began operations. For most others, ample evidence
from subsequent laws, newspaper notices, letters, and other contemporary sources exists. No
systematic effort, however, has been made to verify the operation of the other corporations. Most
early corporations performed only one activity. A few, however, engaged in two or more
activities, for example bridges and turnpikes or fire and marine insurance. They are categorized
in this chart according to what appears to have been their primary activity.
Sources: Baldwin 1903; Davis 1917; sundry state session laws, acts and resolves, and statutes at
large were also consulted, as were state archival records and published charters and by-laws
when available.52
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